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COMMON CARRIERS AND RISK DISTRIBUTION:
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY FOR TRANSPORTING
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
INTRODUCTION

On the night of October 17, 1978, eighteen cars of an Illinois Central train derailed in Claxon, Kentucky, causing the
explosion of two tank cars, each containing 22,000 gallons of
vinyl chloride.' The conflagration necessitated the evacuation
of forty-five families from the surrounding area. 2 Earlier in
1978, eight people were killed in Youngstown, Florida, when
vinyl chloride burst from tank cars in a similar derailment.
Occurrences such as these illustrate the serious threat to the
public posed by the transportation of hazardous materials;
they also raise questions concerning the standard of care to be
used in determining tort liability of common carriers who
transport such materials. Courts have often been urged to impose absolute liability on common carriers on the theory'that
the party transporting hazardous materials for profit should
bear the loss.' The doctrine of absolute liability has been uniformly rejected, however, because carriers have a public duty
to accept such materials for transportation. 5 The rule traditionThe Courier-Journal, Oct. 19, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
ZId.

3 Id. at 12, col. 3.
' See, e.g., Christ Church Parish v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 199 A.2d 707, 709 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1964); Pope v. Edward M. Rude Carrier Corp., 75 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1953).
s See, e.g., Note, Carriers-DifferenceBetween Private and Common Carriagein
Respect to Motor Transportationof Goods, 6 Wis. L. Rzv. 35 (1930). The Interstate
Commerce Commission defined a common carrier in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935:
The term "common carrier by motor vehicle" means any person which holds
itself out to the general public to engage in the transportation by motor
vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce of passengers or property or any
class or classes thereof for compensation, whether over regular or irregular
routes, except transportation by motor vehicle by an express company to the
extent that such transportation has heretofore been subject to chapter I of
this title, to which extent such transportation shall continue to be considered
to be and shall be regulated as transportation subject to chapter I of this
title.
49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(14) (1963).
Common carriers of property have been subjected to a high standard of care by
the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1951), as well as by the common law.
The burden of the risk of loss has been placed on the carrier when dealing with
nonhazardous goods. Although the carrier's liability is not absolute, the areas of its
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ally applied is that the carrier of an inherently dangerous substance owes to the public the duty to exercise care commensurate with the danger of its distribution.'
The firm judicial position that common carriers are exempt from the rule of absolute liability for harm caused by
miscarriage of an ultrahazardous activity has been rejected in
recent years by two courts employing different theories. The
court in Siegler v. Kuhlman7 ruled that as between two innocent parties-a common carrier and a girl who died in a violent
liability are extensive. Carriers have attempted to limit their liability and to shift or
allocate the risk of loss. For a discussion of the subject of carrier liability, see Skulina,
Liability of a Carrierfor Loss and Damage to Interstate Shipments, 17 CLEv.-MAR. L.

REv. 251 (1968). For a thorough analysis of two of the most common devices utilized
to allocate the risk of loss, i.e., "benefit of insurance" and "hold harmless" clauses,
see Hardman & Winter, The Interstate Commerce Act and the Allocation of the Risk
of Loss or Damage in the Transportationof Freight,7 TRANsp. L.J. 137 (1975).
1 By applying this negligence standard to common carriers of hazardous materials,
courts rejected the contention that transporting explosives amounted to an ultrahazardous activity; those courts which designated the activity as ultrahazardous,
however, recognized the common carrier exception to absolute liability. The American Law Institute (hereinafter referred to as ALI) offers the following definition of an
untrahazardous activity:
An activity is ultrahazardous if it
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and
(b) is not a matter of common usage.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TorS replaces the
term "ultrahazardous" with "abnormally dangerous" and suggests the consideration
of six factors in determining whether an activity warrants the imposition of strict
liability:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:,
(a) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) Whether the gravity of the harm which may result from it is
likely to be great;
(c) Whether the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) Whether the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(a) Whether the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is
carried on; and
(f) The value of the activity to the community.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
1 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). For a collection
of the cases discussing carrier liability incident to the transportation of petroleum
products, see Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1169 (1970). See also Avins, Absolute Liability for
Oil Spillage, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359 (1970); Stone, The Trans-Alaska Pipeline and
Strict Liability for Oil PollutionDamage, 9 URB. L. ANN. 179 (1975).
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explosion of gasoline transported by the carrier-the one engaged in the ultrahazardous activity for profit should bear the
economic loss. The court in Chavez v. Southern Pacific TransportationCo. 8 discovered an adequate reason for subjecting the
common carrier to absolute liability in the theory of "enterprise
liability"9 as developed by Justice Traynor 1 and Professor Calabresi." Essentially, the theory proposes that the person engaged in the enterprise should bear the initial loss when the
enterprise miscarries, especially when the person is engaged in
the enterprise for profit and is in a suitable position to adminis2
ter the loss so that it will ultimately be borne by the public.'
An analysis of the Siegler and the Chavez cases will demonstrate that their basic premises are sound. Before turning to
a consideration of those cases, however, it is important to examine briefly Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Central Railroad,3 the
leading case enunciating the common carrier exception traditionally accepted by the courts. The arguments posited by the
Ingrid court in support of the common carrier exception are
largely nullified by the concept of enterprise liability as applied
by the Chavez court. It should become apparent that the enter-

s 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976). Since California had not developed any
exception for common carriers, the federal district court had the "doubtful privilege
of trying to 'guess' whether the California courts would except Southern Pacific from
the general standard of strict liability imposed on those engaged in ultrahazardous
activity." Id. at 1205.
In its broadest terms the theory of enterprise liability in torts is that
losses to society created or caused by an enterprise, or more simply, by an
activity, ought to be borne by that enterprise oractivity. Stated somewhat
more precisely, the theory contemplates that losses historically recognized
as compensable when caused by an enterprise, or activity, such as producing,
distributing and using automobiles, ought to be borne by those persons who
have some logical relationship with that enterprise or activity.
Klemme, The Enterprise Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. Rlv. 153, 158 (1976).
Klemme derives his definition and description of the theory of enterprise liability from
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAw OF ToRS § 13.1, at 760 (1956); Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); James,
Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549
(1948). See also Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rv.
359 (1951); Morris, Hazardous Enterprisesand Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J.
1172 (1952).
11See text accompanying notes 51-59 infra for a discussion of Justice Traynor's
theory of risk distribution.
" See text accompanying notes 60-66 infra for a discussion of Professor Calabresi's
theory of risk distribution as the Chavez court interpreted and applied it.
," 413 F. Supp. at 1208-09.
13216 F. 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 615 (1914).
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prise theory of tort is a viable substitute for traditional negligence principles in this area of common carrier liability.
I. THE

COMMON CARRIER EXCEPTION AND ITS REJECTION

Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. CentralRairoad'4 is based on the
theory that it would be inconsistent to rule that common carriers must accept hazardous materials for transportation and
also subject them to absolute liability for damages resulting
from accidents inevitably arising from such an activity. In
Ingrid, a shipowner maintained suit to recover for the loss of
his ship, which had been destroyed when train cars loaded with
dynamite exploded. The court followed the fundamental rule
that "to sustain an action for a tort, the damage complained
of must have come from a wrongful act."' 5 Grievous injury to
an individual, if resulting from an unavoidable accident involving no carelessness or negligence, does not give rise to an
action for damages. 6 The reasoning of the court merits quoting in relevant part, since the Chavez court later considered
this very reasoning in the process of deciding that common
carriers should be held strictly liable for damages resulting
from the miscarriage of ultrahazardous activities:
We think there can be no doubt, so far as a common carrier
is concerned, that such danger as necessarily results to others
from the performance of its duty, without negligence, must
be borne by them as an unavoidable incident of the lawful
performance of legitimate business .... It certainly would
be an extraordinary doctrine for courts of justice to promulgate to say that a common carrier is under legal obligation
to transport dynamite and is an insurer against any damage
which may result in the course of transportation, even though
it has been guilty of no negligence which occasioned the explosion which caused the injury. It is impossible to find any
adequate reason for such a principle. 7
Although it recognized that the English case of Rylands v.
Fletcher" supports imposing absolute liability on common car, Id. at 76-78.
,Id. at 78.
t Id.

1' Id.
Is [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330. In Rylands v. Fletcher,the defendant mill owners were
held absolutely liable for damages to an unused coal mine shaft caused by water
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riers, the Ingrid court was unpersuaded by this doctrine. It
noted that American courts "generally disapproved"'" the application of Fletcherbecause it is in "'direct conflict with the
law as settled in this country.' "20 The court further said, "[A
rule which] 'casts upon an innocent person the responsibility
of an insurer is a hard one at best, and will not be generally
applied unless required by some public policy or the contract
of the parties.'
A.

"21

Siegler and the "PrimitiveAppeal to Fairness' 22

The Ingrid position was widely accepted 23 and remained
escaping from a reservoir constructed upon their property. Justice Blackburn, in the
Exchequer Chamber, stated the rule of the case, which was later rejected by American
courts:
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief
if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does not do so is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is a natural consequence of its escape.
Fletcher v. Rylands, [18661 L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279-80. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF ToRTS § 78 (4th ed. 1971).
1"216 F. at 77.
2 Id., quoting Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 486.
21Id. at 78, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 460 (Pa. 1886).
2 See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra for an analysis of Smith v. Lockheed
Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967) which provides an illustration of the "fairness"
rationale for subjecting a person engaging in ultrahazardous activities to absolute
liability. "By so stating the Smith court gave reference in Lutheringer to the 'best
public policy,' and provided California courts with a rationale other than the primitive
appeal to fairness." 413 F. Supp. at 1208.
n In 1938, the ALI adopted the Ingrid position that strict liability should not be
imposed where the carrier is acting pursuant to a public duty. The general rule adopted
by the ALI provides that "one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to
another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be
harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity. . . . although the utmost

care is exercised to prevent the harm."

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 519 (1938). The ALI

carved out an exception to the general rule by providing that absolute liability "does
not apply if the activity is carried on in pursuance of a public duty imposed upon the
actor as a public officer or as a common carrier." Id. at § 521. This exception is
explained in Comment (a) to § 521, which states that a "common carrier, in so far as
it is required to carry such explosives as are offered to it for carriage, is not liable for
harm done by their explosion, unless it has failed to take care in their carriage which
their dangerous character requires." Thus, the ALI adopted a negligence standard for
common carriers and declined to recommend strict liability where the ultrahazardous
activity was required of the common carrier.
In Pope v. Edward M. Rude Carrier Corp., 75 S.E.2d 584, 595-97 (W. Va. 1953),
the court quoted Ingrid at length to conclude that neither a contract carrier licensed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission nor the shipper of high explosives was absolutely liable to third persons for injuries resulting from explosions which occurred while
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unmodified until 1973, when it was rejected by the Supreme
Court of Washington in Siegler v. Kuhlman.4 The court applied the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine25 to find the defendant
liable for the wrongful death of a motorist whose automobile
exploded in gasoline spilled on the highway from the defendant
owner's gasoline trailer. 2 The majority relied on two theories 7
in holding the defendant carrier strictly liable: that "as a matter of abstract justice," the burden should be put "upon the one
of the two innocent parties whose acts instigated or made the
harm possible,

'28

and that problems of proof-including the

likely destruction of evidence when ultrahazardous activities
29
miscarry-justify a strict liability standard.
. The Siegler court quoted from the Restatement (Second)
of Torts the general rule that one who engages in ultrahazardous activity must bear absolute liability for damages resulting
hazardous cargo was being transported. The court expressly rejected the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher in connection with the liability of common carriers for injuries
resulting from explosives occurring without their negligence, and agreed that the carrier's liability should be based upon negligence. Id. at 596.
A more recent case, Christ Church Parish v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 199 A.2d 707
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1964), arose out of a chemical explosion which resulted in extensive
property damage and the deaths of four firemen. The court, following the RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 521, rejected the contention that the carriers were absolutely liable for the
deaths and damage that resulted from the explosion of chemicals the defendants were
transporting. Rather, the court held, the carrier "of an inherently dangerous substance
owes to the public the duty to exercise care commensurate with the danger of its
distribution." Id. at 708.
"1502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973).
2 See note 18 supra for a statement of the holding in Rylands v.Fletcher. The
doctrine has been explained on the basis that the "defendant will be liable when he
damages another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the
place where it is maintained, in the light of the character of that place and its surrounding." W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRS § 78 (4th ed. 1971). The Siegler court provides
a good example of the way the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher is currently applied:
"The basic principles supporting the Fletcher doctrine. . . control the transportation
of gasoline as freight along the public highways the same as it does the impounding of
waters and for largely the same reasons." 502 P.2d at 1184.
28 502 P.2d at 1184-87.
" These theories were taken by the Siegler court from Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort law, 46 WASH. L. Rsv. 225, 240 (1971). Also cited were
Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. Rsv. 537 (1972) and Comment, Liability Without Fault:Logic and Potentialof a Developing Concept, 1970 Wis.
L. REv. 1201 (1970).

502 P.2d at 1185.
Id. The court also noted the inherent difficulty of proving causation under a
negligence standard. Id.
21
2
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when such activity miscarries.30 The court omitted, however,
any consideration of section 5211' and the established exception
for common carriers expressed therein. For this reason the
court's treatment of the dilemma is largely inadequate. Although the court provided an eloquent and persuasive description of the perils of transporting gasoline as freight along the
public highways, it made no attempt to reconcile the common
carriers' duty to accept hazardous materials for transportation
with the strict liability which the court imposed. The court
opined that as between the carrier who engaged in the enterprise for economic gain and the innocent girl who lost her life
when the enterprise miscarried, abstract justice or fairness required the carrier to bear the loss. 3 2 This position recognizes
that the carrier cannot by exercising "due and reasonable care
assure protection to the public from the disastrous consequences of concealed or latent mechanical or metallurgical defects in the carrier's equipment . . . and from all of the other
hazards not generally disclosed or guarded against by reasonable care, prudence, and foresight."33 Largely because such
accidents are unpreventable, the Siegler court rejected the
negligence standard as inadequate to protect the public from
the dangers inherent in transporting large quantities of exposives. 4
" Id. at 1186-87. The Siegler court pointed out that the RpSrATEmENT (SEcoND)

§ 519 was adopted as a rule of decision in Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v.
Port of Seattle, 491 P.2d 1037 (Wash. 1971). However, in Pacific North Bell, the
application of strict liability was rejected solely because the installation of underground water mains by a municipality was not, under the circumstances shown, an
"abnormally dangerous activity." Siegler v.Kuhlman, 502 P.2d at 1187. The court
continued to contrast the:
relatively safe, routine procedure of installing and using underground water
mains ... with the activity of carrying gasoline as freight in quantities of
thousands of gallons at freeway speeds ... through cities and towns and on
secondary roads in rural districts .... [O]ne cannot escape the conclusion
that hauling gasoline as cargo is undeniably an abnormally dangerous activity and on its face possesses all of the factors necessary for imposition of strict
liability as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1964) above.
OF ToRrs

Id.

31See note 23 supra for a discussion of the ALI position regarding the common

carrier exception as reflected in the

RESTATEMENT OF

Tors.

3

502 P.2d at 1185.

33

Id. at 1187.

34

Id. This conclusion represents a policy decision that where negligence cannot
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Chavez and EnterpriseLiability

In 1976 the Federal Court for the Eastern District of California decided Chavez v. Southern Pacific Transportation
Co.,"; in which recovery was sought for personal injuries and
property damage caused when approximately eighteen bombloaded boxcars exploded in Southern Pacific's rail yard. Southern Pacific argued that under California law a common carrier
could not be held strictly liable for damages resulting from the
36
carriage of explosives insofar as it has a duty to carry them.
This argument was rejected by the court, which concluded that
California would not "carve out an exception for common carriers engaged in a public duty. .... 3
The Chavez analysis began with the proposition that the
transportation of hazardous materials is an ultrahazardous activity; the defendant did not contest this designation, but
based its argument on the common carrier exception developed
by the ALI and the courts. However, the court noted that strict
liability had been imposed in previous California cases involving ultrahazardous activities, the primary example being
Green v. General Petroleum Corp.38 In Green, the Supreme
Court of California decided "that one engaged in oil-drilling in
a residential area should be absolutely liable for damages resulting from an oil well 'blow-out.' "
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise
lawful and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under
known conditions, and, with knowledge that injury may result to another, proceeds, and injury is done to the other as
the direct and proximate consequence of the act, however
carefully done, the one who does the act and causes the injury
be proved, the person who engages in the extrahazardous activity for profit should bear
the loss.
" 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
"Id. at 1205-06.
1 Id. at 1213. See note 23 suprafor a discussion of the exception which the Chavez
court thoroughly examined but rejected.
" 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928). See generallyEhrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault,54
CAL. L. RFv. 1422 (1966); Foster & Keeton, Liability Without Fault in Oklahoma, 3
OKLA. L. Rzv. 1 (1950); Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30
MicH. L. REv. 1001 (1932).

P Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
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should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other
for the damage done. 0
The Chavez court carefully considered whether this doctrine
could be appropriately applied when the person engaging in the
ultrahazardous enterprise is a common carrier. The court reasoned:
If California predicated liability solely upon the "fairness"
rationale appearing in the Green case, it might well find that
strict liability was inappropriate. Where the carrier has no
choice but to accept dangerous cargo and engage in an ultrahazardous activity, it is the public which is requiring the
carrier to engage in the anti-social activity. The carrier is
innocent.4
In this manner the court squarely faced the difficult issue
which the Siegler court had ignored.
The justification for applying absolute liability to common
carriers was found in a number of earlier California decisions
adopting the risk distribution theory." The Chavez court reasoned that since the public requires the carrier to engage in the
anti-social activity, "there is no logical reason for creating a
'public duty' exception when the .rationale for subjecting the
carrier to absolute liability is the carrier's ability to distribute
the loss to the public."43 Simply stated, the public pays for
requiring the carrier to engage in the activity which is by nature dangerous to the public. Consequently, "[t]he harsh impact of inevitable disasters is softened by spreading the cost
among a greater population and over a larger time period."'"
The person engaged in the hazardous enterprise is in the most
suitable position to pass the cost to the public and "the social
and economic benefits which are ordinarily derived from imposing strict liability are achieved." 4
"
"

Green v. Gen. Petroleum Co., 270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928).
413 F. Supp. at 1213-14.

, See notes 50-57 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the major

California cases adopting the risk distribution theory.
10413 F. Supp. at 1214.

" Id.
" Id.
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COMMON CARRIERS AND THE RISK DISTRmIBUTION RATIONALE

It has been pointed out that imposition of absolute liability "on one who intentionally engages in an activity which
presents an unusual hazard to the community.

. .

reflects an

unarticulated social policy determination as to who should
bear the loss as between two parties when an accident occurs." 6 That traditional principles of negligence will sometimes give way to economic considerations was recognized
nearly sixty years ago by Roscoe Pound when he wrote that
"[tihere is a strong and growing tendency, where there is no
blame on either side, to ask in view of the exigencies of social
justice, who can best bear the loss."47 This capacity to bear the
loss has been defined as the corporate defendant's ability to
"pass on" the cost of liability to the consumers of its services
and products in the form of higher rates or prices. Professor
Feezer, in his classic article on the subject, outlined the mechanics of the risk distribution process:
The defendant upon whom is placed the burden of a money
loss in a tort action may distribute the loss by insurance or
by adding it to the cost of carrying on his business; in either

case it is distributed ultimately upon society. In so far as
society approves this distribution of loss, it would seem that

it is admitting its ultimate responsibility for injuries which
arise out of a civilization of increasing social inderdepen-

dence.41

This theory led the Chavez court to reject the common
carrier exception to the general rule of absolute liability for
engaging in ultrahazardous activities. Society, by imposing
"Bergman, No FaultLiabilityfor Oil Pollution Damage, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1,
30 (1973-74). Bergman advocates applying strict liability on the basis of risk distribution for reasons similar to those which guided the Siegler and the Chavez courts:
[The field of oil transport] has become an extra-hazardous activity, where
the taking of reasonable precautions can in no way guarantee that the damage will be averted. The tortfeasor has a "deep pocket" and is able to distribute the risk among its customers, etc.
Id. at 21. Bergman applied the theories of Justice Traynor and Professor Calabresi in
a manner similar to the Chavez court to conclude that the oil industry, i.e., carriers
and shippers, should be subjected to absolute liability for all "commercial and property damage caused by accidental offshore spillage, irrespective of fault." Id.
41R. PoUND, TH SPMrT OF THE COMMON LAW 189 (1921).
" Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factorin the Decision of Certain Types of
Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. Ray. 805, 809-10 (1930).

1978-79]

TRANSPORTING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

upon the common carrier the duty to transport hazardous materials, can fairly be said to admit "ultimate responsibility" for
the calamities which result; under this theory the common
carrier may "distribute the loss by insurance or by adding to
the cost of carrying on his business."4 The central element in
this theory, as stated by Chavez, is that the public is the ultimate cost bearer. When viewed in this context, the public duty
exception to common carrier liability becomes both irrelevant
and unnecessary.
A.

Justice Traynor's Theory of Risk Distribution

The Chavez court relied upon established California precedent in holding common carriers strictly liable for damages
resulting from ultrahazardous activities. Although the common
carrier issue had not been presented to California courts prior
to Chavez, strict liability justified by the rationale of risk distribution had been applied in several other areas of tort law. 0
The first use of the risk distribution rationale for imposing
strict liability in California came in Justice Traynor's oftencited concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.5 '
While the majority affirmed the plaintiffs judgment on a res
ipsa loquitur theory,"2 Justice Traynor reasoned that the same
result could be reached with a theory of strict liability:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and loss
0 Id. Bergman has a section which explains precisely what Professor Feezer meant
by this statement:
A factor which must be seriously considered in determining who should bear
initial liability is the relative ability to insure against liability. This presumably would present no difficulty to the vessel owner as he is already carrying
insurance to protect himself against other maritime mishaps, including,
most probably, damage caused by negligent spills. Thus while absolute liability imposed on the oil company would involve it in an entirely new series
of insurance constracts [sic] and transactions, the placing of the burden on
the tanker company would simply entail an adjustment in insurance coverage and premiums, with the expense of the latter ultimately defrayed by the
oil company nonetheless.
Bergman, supra note 46, at 39.
" The Chavez court admitted that there is no direct authority indicating whether
California courts would accept or reject an exemption for common carriers based on
some form of public authorization. 413 F. Supp. at 1206.
it 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944).
"Id. at 440.
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of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
53
public as a cost of doing business.
"Justice Traynor," stated the Chavez court, "firmly imprinted
this reasoning into California's strict liability law in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. . . . in
which California led other jurisdictions by finding that the
products liability of a manufacturer was governed by the law
of strict liability in tort, and not by the law of contract warranties." Justice Traynor, in explaining this proposition, had
noted, "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them55
selves."
This proposition was adopted in Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co.,56 which involved property damage caused by tremors made when a solid fuel rocket motor was fired nosedown
while fixed to a test stand. The court, after finding that this
test firing involved an inherent risk of damage that could not
be eliminated by the exercise of due care, concluded:
In these circumstances, public policy calls for strict liability.
There is no basis, either in reason or justice, for requiring the
innocent neighboring landowner to bear the loss. Defendant,
who is engaged in the enterprise for profit, is in a position best
able to administer the loss so that it will ultimately be borne
by the public. As Professor Prosser summarizes the rationale
for the imposition of strict liability: "The problem is dealt
with as one of allocating a more or less inevitable loss to be
charged against a complex and dangerous civilization, and
liability is placed upon the party best able to shoulder it."-"
Based upon this reasoning, the Chavez court concluded that
13

Id. at 441.

"413 F. Supp. at 1208.
u Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). One of the
most articulate recent statements of these criteria of enterprise liability as applied in
the context of strict liability for defective products is that of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63-65 (Wis. 1967).
" 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Ct. App. 1967).
" Id. at 137.
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risk distribution was a suitable rationale for applying strict
liability to common carriers which transport hazardous materials. 6 Simply stated, the theory of risk distribution enables the
common carrier to "'administer the loss so that it will ultimately be borne by the public,' "51 and is in this manner consistent with the public duty imposed upon the carrier.
B.

Chavez and Calabresi'sTheory of Risk Distribution

The Chavez court supplemented its use of Justice Traynor's theory with the socio-economic underpinnings of risk distribution as developed by Professor Calabresi. 0 Professor Calabresi discerned two primary benefits resulting from the indirect
imposition of liability on the public (which profits from and
requires the dangerous activity):
(1) the adverse impact of any particular misfortune is lessened by spreading its cost over a greater population and over
a larger time period and (2) social and economic resources are
more efficiently allocated when the actual costs of goods and
services (including the losses they entail) are reflected in
their price to the consumer."
The court concluded that subjecting Southern Pacific to abso62
lute liability would achieve both results.
Central to Professor Calabresi's theory is the idea that
society should produce the types and quantities of commodities
that people desire, since it is assumed "that people know what
is best for themselves. 6 3 The correlative to this principle is
that people cast their "marketplace votes"6 with the normal
expectation that the goods or services they buy will not inade" 413 F. Supp. at 1209.
" Id., quoting Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137 (Ct. App.
1967).
" See note 8 supra for a general definition of "enterprise liability." Other articles
by Professor Calabresi on the general subject of risk distribution include Calabresi,
Does the FaultSystem Optimally ControlPrimaryAccident Costs?, 33 L. & Cowrai.
PROB. 429 (1968); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 713 (1965); and Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Risk Distribution].
" 413 F. Supp. at 1209.

12Id.

"Risk Distribution,supra note 60,'at 502.
U Id. at 505.
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quately perform or result in injuries to themselves. The central
idea in Professor Calabresi's theory of risk distribution is that:
[Tihe most desirable system of loss distribution under a
strict resource-allocation theory is one in which the prices of
goods accurately reflect their full cost to society. The theory
therefore requires, first, that the cost of injuries should be
borne by the activities which caused them, whether or not
fault is involved, because, either way, the injury is a real cost
of those activities. . . . Second, the theory requires that
among the several parties engaged in an enterprise the loss
should be placed on the party which is most likely to cause
the burden to be reflected in the price of whatever the enterprise sells. "5
This price reflection idea is particularly meaningful when applied to common carriers engaged in the transportation of hazardous materials because, as the Siegler court pointed out, it
'is generally impossible to determine fault when an accident
obliterates all of the evidence." The party involved in the

ultrahazardous activity is usually the logical person to distribute the loss evenly upon society; when it is impossible to determine whose negligence caused the accident, it is particularly
appropriate that the person who engaged in the enterprise
for economic gain be assigned the initial liability. The net
result of this application is that the carrier will obtain greater
amounts of insurance and increase its carriage rates, and that
the shipper will in turn increase the price of the goods to the
public." This is the very mechanism contemplated by Profes1 Id. Professor Keeton would ground the fairness of this theory on the general
principle of unjust enrichment. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72
HArv. L..Rav. 401, 409 (1959). The Minnesota Supreme Court would apparently do
the same, see Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197 N.W. 971 (Minn. 1924),
holding the city strictly liable for damages caused by a break in a large high-pressure
water line.
In such a case, even though negligence be absent, natural justice would seem
to demand that the enterprise, or what really is the same thing, the whole
community benefited by the enterprise, should stand the loss rather than the
individual. It is too heavy a burden upon one.
Id. at 972.
" 502 P.2d at 1185. For other views of the merits of a strict liability theory as
opposed to a fault theory as a means of preventing accidents, see Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 205 (1973).
' See Bergman, supra note 46, at 31-33 for his application of the enterprise theory
in the context of oil transporters; the same application should be made with regard to
common carriers of hazardous cargo in general.
It is possible for a motor carrier to increase its carriage rates under 49 U.S.C. §
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sor Feezer in 1930.68
CONCLUSION

The Ingrid court, in the traditional approach to common
carrier liability, decided that those who are injured by accidents resulting from ultrahazardous activity must bear the loss
as an unavoidable incident of the lawful performance of legitimate business. Further, the Ingrid court stated that it was
impossible to find any adequate reason for subjecting common
carriers, who operate under a legal obligation to transport hazardous materials, to absolute liability.
In sharp contrast, the Chavez court held that the cost of
engaging in ultrahazardous activities must be initially borne by
the party engaged in the enterprise for profit, that cost being
an unavoidable incident of the lawful performance of legitimate business. The "adequate reason" sought by the Ingrid
court was discovered by the Chavez court in the rationale underlying the risk distribution theory: The common carrier is in
an ideal position to distribute the cost of an accident upon the
public. It is appropriate that ultimate liability rest upon the
public because the public requires the common carrier to engage in the ultrahazardous activity for society's benefit. The
Chavez court properly concluded that there is no "logical reason" for creating a public duty exception when the theory behind subjecting the common carrier to absolute liability is the
carrier's ability to pass the cost to the party which mandates
the activity-the public.
by James F. Roberts
316 (1963) provided it can sustain the burden of showing that the proposed change is
just and reasonable. See, e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 346 F. Supp.
349 (M.D. N.C.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1121 (1973) and United States v. Burlington Truck
Line, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 582 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd with modifications, 501 F.2d 928
(8th Cir. 1974).
, See text accompanying note 48 supra for a description of Professor Feezer's
concept of how the risk distribution mechanism should work.

